Subsidiarity of the criminal justice system and corruption
Keywords:
Harmfulness, Transparency, GovernanceAbstract
Reducing corruption in Brazil cannot fall solely on the criminal justice system, but requires coordinated public policies and civil participation capable of transforming the national culture. The symbolic, expansive, and often ineffective criminal justice model is evident in the generic classification of crimes against public administration, the abuse of exceptional procedural instruments, and media operations that inflame the spectacle without ensuring proportional results. The meta-rule of criminal subsidiarity requires weighing the available means, reserving criminal intervention for what is indispensable. It can be concluded that preventive measures, such as transparency in public tenders, corporate governance, and integrity programs, are essential.
Downloads
References
SANCHES-OSTIZ, Pablo. Sobre la aspiración a un derecho penal subsidiario: en qué medida es posible la subsidiariedad de los instrumentos penales? Cuadernos de Política Criminal. Numero n. 11, II, época II, p. 37-67, diciembre 2013.
SOUZA, Luciano Anderson. Crimes contra a administração pública. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais. 2018.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Copyright of published articles belongs to the author, but with journal rights over the first publication and respecting the one-year exclusivity period. Authors may only use the same results in other publications by clearly indicating this journal as the medium of the original publication. If there is no such indication, it will be considered a situation of self-plagiarism.
Therefore, the reproduction, total or partial, of the articles published here is subject to the express mention of the origin of its publication in this journal, citing the volume and number of this publication. For legal purposes, the source of the original publication must be consigned, in addition to the DOI link for cross-reference (if any).
